Horses and Rabbits? Optimal Dynamic Capital Structure from Shareholder and Manager Perspectives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Miller's Equilibrium, Shareholder Leverage Clienteles, and Optimal Capital Structure
Miller's Equilibrium, Shareholder Leverage Clienteles, and Optimal Capital Structure Author(s): E. Han Kim Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Washington, D.C., December 28-30, 1981 (May, 1982), pp. 301-319 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the American Finance Association Stable URL: htt...
متن کاملDynamic Optimal Capital Structure and Technological Change
This paper incorporates the cost of adjustment between observed and optimal leverage in explaining the variation in firm’s equity or bank-debt financing investments. Using a dynamic adjustment approach identifies the determinants to capital structure between different financial systems. In relation to firm sales U.K and U.S firms have 50-100 percent more equity financing than Swedish firms depe...
متن کاملManager Characteristics and Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence∗
We theoretically and empirically investigate the effects of manager-specific characteristics on capital structure. We develop a dynamic structural model in which a manager affects a firm’s earnings through her ability and effort. The manager receives dynamic incentives through explicit contracts with shareholders. We derive the manager’s contracts and implement them through financial securities...
متن کاملManager Characteristics and Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence
We investigate the effects of manager characteristics on capital structure. We first develop a dynamic structural model that incorporates managerial discretion in effort and financing, as well as agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. We derive the manager’s dynamic contract and implement it through financial securities. This leads to a dynamic capital structure for the firm c...
متن کاملSpecific Human Capital, Credible Commitment and Optimal Capital Structure
In this paper, we show that although ex ante equityholders would like to adopt an optimal displacement and operating policy, they may not have incentives to implement such a policy ex post when the manager acquires firmspecific human capital and becomes indispensable to the firm’s continued operation. An optimal mix of debt and equity can serve as a commitment device in disciplining the manager...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.345821