Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strateg...
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Many insights regarding rank-order tournaments rest upon contestants’ behavior in symmetric equilibria. As shown by Gill and Stone (2010), however, symmetric equilibria may not exist if contestants are expectation-based loss averse and have choice-acclimating expectations. We show that under choice-unacclimating—i.e., fixed— expectations both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria exist for all de...
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We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to part...
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Article history: Received 24 February 2010 Available online 5 March 2012 JEL classification: C73 D82 L14 J30
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2955722