Information and two-sided platform profits
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Platform Differentiation in Two-Sided Markets
In this paper we investigate a two-sided market platform model. In the standard framework, firms interact with consumers through one or more platform providers. For example, video game providers (firms) develop games for a gaming console (platform), and end users (consumers) play these games on the console. Consumer utility may depend on the number of other consumers who interact on one side of...
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Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board ”. Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform compe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.04.001