Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Changes^ Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change*
Global games of regime change that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information over t...
متن کاملInformation Dynamics and Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change∗ George-Marios Angeletos MIT and NBER
Global games of regime change — that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a “status quo” is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it — have been used to study crises phenomena such bank runs, currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information ove...
متن کاملInformation Acquisition in Global Games of Regime Change (Online Appendix)
This appendix contains the proofs of all the intermediate results that have been omitted from the paper, as well as extensions of several results reported in the paper. The appendix is divided into 6 sections. In Section 2 we show that for any distribution of precision choices , there are no non-monotonic equilibria in the second stage of the game. We also establish properties of the ex-ante ut...
متن کاملInformation acquisition in global games of regime change
We study costly information acquisition in global games, which are coordination games where payo¤s are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the average action of agents. We show that only symmetric equilibria exist and we provide su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. We then characterize the value of information in this context and link it to the underlying parameters of the model. We ex...
متن کاملDynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks
This supplementary document contains a formal analysis of some of the extensions briefly discussed in Section 5 of the published version. Section A1 considers the game in which agents receive signals about the size of past attacks. Section A2 considers the game with observable shocks to the fundamentals. Section A3 considers the variant in which agents observe the shocks with a one-period lag. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.634381