Legal Instruments Regulating the Transfer of Financial Resources to Tax Havens
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Honor among Tax Havens
This note presents a simple, partial equilibrium model of the supply of offshore tax havens, when multinationals are capable of sheltering some of their worldwide income. It provides a few contrasting predictions to those in “Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens” by Slemrod and Wilson. Slemrod and Wilson model tax sheltering as a production process which uses up scarce resources in the tax...
متن کاملTax competition with parasitic tax havens
⁎ Corresponding author. Stephen M. Ross School of Bu 701 Tappan Street, Rm. R5396, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1 936 3914; fax: +734 936 8716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Slemrod). 1 The OECD report distinguished tax havens from significant revenues from the income tax but have prefe kinds of income, generally restricted to non-residents; about the kind of tax haven covered by the OECD's def...
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For many individuals and organizations, cyber-insurance is the most practical and only way of handling a major financial impact of an information security event. However, the cyber-insurance market suffers from the problem of information asymmetry, lack of product diversity, illiquidity, high transaction cost, and so on. On the other hand, in theory, capital market-based financial instruments c...
متن کاملEconomic Effects of Regional Tax Havens
How does the opportunity to use tax havens influence economic activity in nearby non-haven countries? Analysis of affiliate-level data indicates that American multinational firms use tax haven affiliates to reallocate taxable income away from hightax jurisdictions and to defer home country taxes on foreign income. Ownership of tax haven affiliates is associated with reduced tax payments by near...
متن کاملTax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment
In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contrib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio H, Oeconomia
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0459-9586
DOI: 10.17951/h.2016.50.1.469