Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0033-5533,1531-4650
DOI: 10.2307/2946661