Maintaining Privacy in Cartels
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Maintaining Privacy in Cartels∗
It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels– monitoring of competitors’ prices, sales, and profits– facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead gone out of their way to preserve the privacy of their participants’actions and outcomes. Towards explaining this behavior, we show that cartels can sometimes sustain higher profits when actions and outcomes a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/699975