Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019