Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either singleor multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction st...
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We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale affects both entry and bidding, and, in particular, ...
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We study a sequential auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions: Under the monopoly offer, there does not exist...
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In a first-price auction, asymmetries among bidders typically result in inefficient allocations— that is, the winner of the auction may not be the person who values the object the most. This inefficiency creates a motive for post-auction resale, and when bidders take resale possibilities into account, their bidding behavior is affected as well. Standard models of such auctions, by and large, im...
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This paper studies auctions held before bidders are sure of the values they place on the object for sale, leaving potential gains to subsequent resale trade. While important insights from models of auctions without resale carry over, equilibrium bidding can be fundamentally altered by the endogeneity of valuations and the informational linkages between primary and secondary markets. As a result...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.008