Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies

Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function and...

No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand

Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies constitute the two most prevalent models of firm competition. The analysis of Nash equilibria in each model reveals a unique prediction about the stable state of the system. Quite alarmingly, despite the similarities of the two models, their projections expose a stark dichotomy. Under the Cournot model, where firms compete by strategically managing their output ...

Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory

This paper explores the impact of memory in Cournot oligopolies where firms learn through imitation of success as suggested in Alchian (1950) and modeled in Vega-Redondo (1997). As long as memory includes at least one period, the long-run outcome corresponds to any quantity between the Cournot one and the Walras one. The (evolutionary) stability of the walrasian outcome relies on inter-firm com...

The Stability of Nash-Cournot Equilibria in Labor Managed Oligopolies

Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies

Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the negative externalities they impose on each other. Such behaviors generally lead to inefficient outcomes where the social welfare is bounded away from its optimal value. However, in practice, self-interested individuals explore the possibility of circumventing such negative externalities by forming co...