Nash versus coarse correlation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Improving Nash by coarse correlation
We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential games. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games, and show that it is achieved by a CCE...
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We consider a class of quadratic potential games and prove that (simple symmetric) coarse correlated equilibria (as introduced by Moulin and Vial 1978) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs (that can not be improved upon by correlated equilibrium a la Aumann). We fully characterise the structure of the coarse correlated equilibrium that achieves the maximum improvement possible...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09647-x