Non-Metaphysical Realism: A Dummett-Inspired Implementation of Putnam's Internal Realism

Metaphysical Realism and Thought

In this paper I identify some unexplored implications of content externalism. The implications can be traced to the role that metaphysical realism plays in some of the standard arguments for content externalism. I do not regard these implications as undermining the case for externalism. I identify them, rather, as part of an attempt at honest accounting: the revisionary nature of content extern...

Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism

Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysic...

Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded*

Hilary Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism (commonly referred to as the "model theoretic argument") has now enjoyed two decades of discussion. 1 The text is rich and contains variously construable arguments against variously construed philosophical positions. David Lewis isolated one argument and called it "Putnam's Paradox".2 That argument is clear and concise; so is the paradoxical...

Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism?

Metaphysics of Logical Realism

با اینکه اغلب به غلط تصور می­شود که فلسفۀ تحلیلی، به عنوان یک جنبش ضد-متافیزیکی، هیچ ارتباطی با متافیزیک ندارد، اما دلایل خوبی وجود دارند که بر اساس آن می­توان تمایلات متافیزیکی فیلسوفان تحلیلی را تصدیق نمود و متعاقباً ماهیت ضد-متافیزیکی فلسفه تحلیلی را در تمام مراحل شکل­گیری­اش به حداقل رساند. چون فلسفه تحلیلی یک جنبش تاریخی است که ماهیت اصلی آن در چند مرحله شکل یافته است، لذا با پیگیری این مرا...