Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Under Incomplete and Costly Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.154149