On Epistemic Consequentialism and the Virtue Conflation Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Virtue from the Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Zagzebski
This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcen...
متن کاملA Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism
Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g. the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g. true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remai...
متن کاملepistemic virtue from the viewpoints of mulla sadra and zagzebski
this paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of zagzebski and mulla sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. she sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. mulla sadra, the founder of transcen...
متن کاملDo non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?
Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible i X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial em...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2161-2234
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.218