On repeated games with general information function
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Discounted Repeated Games with General Incomplete Information
We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the payoffs of the players depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm to find all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and...
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We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players’ payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Hörner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and impor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1973
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01737570