Ownership, Managerial Entrenchment, and Corporate Performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value
The nonlinear relationship between corporate value (Tobin's Q) and managerial ownership is well documented. This has commonly been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a more complex structure for the corporate value { managerial ownership function, which accounts for the e®ect...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Governance: An International Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0964-8410
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12053