Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium share...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2663296