Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly
• Two classical models in the theory of oligopoly are those of Coumot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). In both models the equilibrium concept is the noncooperative equilibrium of Nash (1950). In the former firms set quantities. In the latter prices are the strategy variables. In a duopoly situation where firms produce a homogeneous good and marginal costs are constant and equal for both firms, the B...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/3087447