PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONALS ARE ALMOST MONOTONIC
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Probabilistic Conditionals are Almost Monotonic
We examine some old and new paradoxes of probability, give a rough account of probabilistic conditionals, and prove some new results about non-monotonicity in probabilistic conditionals. It is well known that such conditionals are not monotonic – a conditional which is true can become false when additional hypotheses are added. We show that nonetheless, the conditionals are usually monotonic, i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Symbolic Logic
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1755-0203,1755-0211
DOI: 10.1017/s1755020308080106