Quality, Upgrades, and Equilibrium in a Dynamic Monopoly Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quality, Upgrades, and Equilibrium in a Dynamic Monopoly Model
We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to have value the buyer must possess previous qualities: goods are upgrades. We show that subgame perfect e...
متن کاملQuality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market
We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to have value the buyer must possess previous qualities: goods are upgrades. We show that subgame perfect e...
متن کاملQuality , Upgrades , and ( the Loss of ) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model July 2008
1 Anton: [email protected]; Biglaiser: [email protected]. We are grateful to the Fuqua Business Associates Fund and Microsoft for …nancial support. We thank Harvard Business School, the Portuguese Competition Authority, and UCSD for their hospitality where some of this research was conducted. We also thank Leslie Marx, Jean Tirole, many colleagues at conferences and seminars, and, espec...
متن کاملQuality, Upgrades, and (the Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model
We examine an in nite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to have value the buyer must possess previous qualities: goods are upgrades. We nd that the upgrade structu...
متن کاملProcess Innovation and Product Quality Improvement in a Dynamic Monopoly
We investigate the optimal R&D portfolio of a single-product monopolist investing in cost-reducing activities accompanied by efforts improving the quality of its product. There emerges that the firm’s relative incentives along the two directions are conditional upon market affluency, measured by consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, and R&D efforts are complements at equilibrium. We also p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1589748