Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the single-period dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated game. We show here how incomplete information about one or both players’ options, motivation...
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Abstract: More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience–as suggested by backward induction–remains inconclusive. This paper provides a metaanalysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this ...
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This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
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We investigate the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players’ final period of play with small fines. Our incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if (and only if) he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. We show that using this contractua...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1982
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1