REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law and Commerce
سال: 2014
ISSN: 2164-7984,0733-2491
DOI: 10.5195/jlc.2014.67