Relational peace versus pacific primacy: Configuring US strategy for Asia's regional order

This article challenges the presumption that American commitment to greater Indo-Pacific region has positive effects on regional stability. It argues degree which America's strategic choices in Asia embrittle or consolidate peace depends how they intersect with relational configurations of order. An accommodative strategy restraint and mutual threat reduction offers greatest stability least risk either when China's ties a unified are predatory is fractured but it cooperative. A balance-of-power confrontational predatory. And an institutional China enjoys broadly cooperative regardless whether Asian states fractured. Crucially, primacy containment embrittles because conflicts every foreseeable configuration role as Pacific Power should adapt local conditions if serve purpose peace. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“?????”??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“?????”???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????relational order???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Este artículo desafía la presunción de que el compromiso estadounidense con gran región del Indo-Pacífico tiene efectos positivos en estabilidad regional. Argumenta grado las elecciones estratégicas Estados Unidos fragilizan o consolidan paz depende cómo se cruzan configuraciones relacionales orden Una estrategia acomodaticia moderación y reducción amenazas mutuas ofrece mayor menor riesgo, ya sea cuando los lazos un unificada son depredadores está fracturada pero ella cooperativos. equilibrio poder riesgo una confrontación depredadores. Y institucional disfruta amplios cooperación Asia, independientemente si estados asiáticos están unificados fracturados. Fundamentalmente, primacía contención debilita porque entra conflicto toda configuración previsible relacional. El papel como potencia Pacífico debe adaptarse condiciones locales ha servir al propósito What kind US toward best chance keeping stable? question makes no sense from traditional Washington perspective whose starting point for analysis presupposes baseline (hierarchy through accumulation unsurpassable power) hegemony mediates exercise power institutions processes consent). Joseph Nye, example, once argued was Asia's security guarantee, vital condition made everything else possible, remarking, “Security like oxygen: You do not tend notice until you begin lose it” (Nye, 1995, p. 91). Similarly, Hillary Clinton announced “pivot” 2011, she proudly noted “[Asia] eager our leadership business…we have underwritten decades…[because of] irreplaceable Pacific” (Clinton, 2011). These statements reflect commonplace view policymakers renders questions into matters tinkering narrowly, within faith might only right also beyond questioning. That structural domination (whether cast hegemony) proven durable even face historical evidence exposes self-aggrandizing entirely correct (V. Jackson, 2023; Kim, 2022; Pempel, 2008; Tow, 2007). Although my aim concluding this special issue critique Indo-Pacific, acknowledging policy narrative does adequately facts opens space argument: Whether East inflames war consolidates intersects If United States prioritizes stability, then must take care ensure its “mode” engagement matches “moment” relations locally patterned. Table 1 situates optimal under different Asia. argument, draws understanding order suggested introductory (Yeo & Chung, 2023), proceeds four parts. The first outlines three “modes” other than primacy—each presents logic potential strategies conceive bolstering second describes “moments”—how patterns can be configured apart States, draw concepts valence density. third part mode moment, evaluating fit (i.e., stabilizing destabilizing effects) modes configurations. fourth briefly applies framework today, making options just secondary South Korea. conclusion ends brief plea consider pursuing “Indo-Pacific network” may counterproductive promoters attentive what ecosystem international durability To extent aims preserve generation-long “Asian peace”—the absence interstate Pacific—its function theory goals. end, we look competing logics basis ideal-type strategies. In debates about grand strategy—which locate larger conceptual blueprint—there at alternatives primacy: accommodation restraint; balance strategies; institutionalist strategies.1 involves use restraint—that is, refraining coercion military buildups—for ends. requires statecraft actively engage confidence-building, construct valence, reverse some more trends facing Indo-Pacific—the most acute region-wide modernization arms-racing 2021). relies combination mechanisms stability—unilateral restraint, reciprocal consistent “peace signaling” (manipulating forces communicating defensive, benign intentions), activities catalyzing “cooperation spirals” (processes trust-building) (Goldstein, 2015; Kupchan, 2010; Osgood, 1962; Rock, 2000). facilitate reduce risks by alleviating any dilemmas exist, reducing capacity physical destruction one another, narrowing scope grievances become interest (Carpenter Gomez, 2016; Odell, 2021; Shifrinson, 2019). Accommodation antithetical tradition (or very reason bridling lethality—recognizing conduct threatening destabilizing. inhibited willingness make meaningful concessions Asia-Pacific allies, let alone adversaries.2 Accordingly, generally spurned negotiation others tie hands “Goliath's curse”—the need hegemon account extreme imbalances favor bargaining work (Sechser, 2010). novelty expanded horizon policies, possible simply adapting realities dyadic perception gaps discounts overlooks altogether. At same time, peacemaking aspect cannot endlessly one-sided venture, policies support inadvertently propel (by client regimes who previously depended prowess) embolden revisionist regimes. tries uphold equilibrium ensures actor dominate all (Chatterjee, 1972; Nexon, 2009). means distributed system roughly equally, balancing calls continuously revisiting budgets, cautiously calibrating remains so. highly unequally, little stronger power. There contest outpace weaker competitor seeks do. contrary strategy, though discourse employs rhetoric obscures differ (Nexon, While dynamic exists primacy, continually competitor's attempt equilibrium—a “favorable” imbalance. For true contrast, merely anti-hegemonic—continually keep up capabilities sufficient prevent bid (Layne, 1998). hard “it takes far less capability 2023, 207). their conquest order, secure enough. zero-sum tendencies. As applied “near-peer” competitor. Over past two decades, been superiority undertaking massive expansion naval nuclear modernization. necessarily require much retains ample advantages resist, punish, (in cases) outright Chinese predation (Shifrinson, 2020). But competitive superior position encourages continual buildup, increases pressures eventually same. expansionist predatory, foreclosing better world grounded cooperation mutuality. alternative strategy. Andrew Yeo explains, institutions—which includes multilateral organizations, regimes, informal networks—“provide actors governance structures shape order” (Yeo, 2019, 4). Stability thus follows security—they encourage stable relations. structure transaction costs, facilitating linkage, extending “shadow future” (fostering expectations future cooperation), resolving coordination problems around multiple equilibria (He, 2019; Keohane Martin, 1995; Powell, 1991). there myriad features date, key things distinguish per se: qualify logic, (1) nonexclusionary noncontrolling (2) primarily perpetuate antagonisms. On former point, control exclusion, tools empire.3 latter mere existence institution imply presence prioritizing absolute over relative gains—if oppose while favoring others, counter site instrument (like great-power politics). treat instruments politics. approach likely contribute preceded collective desire Put differently, answer territorial expansionism, war, wanton violations rules. Worse, excuse paralysis broken rules norms—that individual refuse action against rule-breakers except grounds legitimate route them (McDougall, Regional ordering mechanism could coercion, dynamics, institutions, path dependence, shared norms identities—different theoretical perspectives explain differently. case, refers among actors. great powers forms context smaller act, sizes act do.4 where both network metaphor ontology analytical value. Two network-relational particular essential—density valence. Density, Chung refer thickness ties, “frequency interactions increased interaction produces thicker ties” 6). High-frequency possible. dense clustering unity cohesion. By sparse exhibit low density, becomes difficult impossible realize. grasp density matters, however, know ties. implications follow depend those doing emotional resonance imprint ecology Rivals frequent interactions—and frequency characterized high-density thick ties—but content antagonistic, mistrustful, and/or coercive. We therefore code rivalry having negative crisis, miscalculation plausible. Every coded produce, giving net turn would define kinds behaviors likely. insight undertheorized literature, appears inchoately discussions ranging ripeness conflict resolution emotion love politics (Boulding, 1978; DeSteno et al., 2000; Hartnett, Lebow, 2017, pp. 161–186; Zartman, 2001, 32–39). So form process, substance. give us way think offer incentives behavior, including small (excluding China) cohesive largely (high density) (low density).5 rest (and will remain) high geography, occupies centrality political economy. Yet positive; rivalrous transgressive, friendly Thus, moment—the conjuncture intra-Asian durably Asia—could positive, experience cohesion fracture. All good contingent context. want thrust conflict, must, therefore, itself moment. Based above, imagine mode-moment matchups deeply negative, promote risk. showing instead goading confrontation, entrust antagonistic without risking feeding emboldenment prone frontline enables counterweight preferences. divide-and-rule obsess Viewed purely realpolitik lens, elements buckpassing (Christensen Snyder, 1990). setting reduces between powers, engages costly peaceful signaling restraint. moves help belligerent, puts strain likelihood serving conjuncture, lacks necessary collectively resist pattern coercive diplomacy expansion. forward fills vacuum, ensuring ambitions materialize attempts conquest. sure, systems prolonged periods time 1978, 104–105), so adversely affects crisis effective, buy quietude time. classical sense, combining calculations correlation selective quid pro quos your rival aspects drive insecurity antihegemonic rather primacist—balancing call undertake arms racing overmatch. strongly promotes Trust, interactions, precedes (Rathbun, 2012). When fractured, expect bulwarks (inclusive latter's valence) inclusive China. ripe governance. bolster undermine region, unlocks wide-ranging possibilities institutionalize restraint-favoring pursue moment already equilibrium. alliance commitments compatible institutionalism intermediate term, transformative formation regime longer needs alliances Even short such ambitions, ecological favorable success inhibiting aggression cooperation. Finally, equally risk, pursued together. quadrant, enough safeguard security—the sparseness intraregional reflects trust needed issues environment, betting distant (relations create distance geopolitical confrontation crisis). provide probe minimal downside With persistently interaction, repertoire based confidence-building measures, control. basically these negligible, reciprocated likes China, North Korea, Myanmar, thickens. sets order—one institutionalized belligerents. primacist countervail aid Balancing each other, cultivate “antagonistic trust” diluting Sino-Asian creating denser “like-minded states…but polarizes further apart” 2022a). adopt meet it? ask says mixed easier case trending positive. region's central hub manufacturing production networks, important trading partner economies, preferred source investment capital (Hung, 2015). had effectively displaced economic before Donald Trump took office 181), “Asia reliant U.S.—and Western—capital since World War II” 195). Nevertheless, Xi Jinping, Communist Party (CPC) resorted rhetorical friction (wolf-warrior diplomacy) governments Xi's predecessors (Martin, paramilitary coercion—Australia, Japan, Philippines, arguably India receiving end pressure another decade. 20th Congress October 2022 christened Jinping's term president, endowing him personalized CPC; signaled ominous environment (Bush 2022). portends especially escalating incentivizes lash out align camp. dimension purposes strategy-making states. density), growing signs organic bloc strategically nonaligned countries. rekindling “third-way” Nonaligned Movement during Cold response assertion new dynamics today. regionalism famously bereft binding union; elite level societal level, community sense. numerous (mostly economic) arrangements coordinating it, driven factors coherent whole. Northeast exceedingly rivalrous, converging Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat coordinates “low politics” extraregional institutions. ASEAN grown inability quell civil well admit Papua New Guinea fold. Trust across extremely (Miall Shibata, solicited alignment (with limited success), effect predictably heighten voice avoiding overreliance “camp.” Indonesia contemplating Organization Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nickel (Hui, explicitly said “will choose” Singapore calling invigorating (Balakrishnan, Kai, staunch ally, wary economically containing (Bloomberg, hedging “central tendency” 2014, 331), compete spheres influence War, tendency bound congeal nonalignment. increasingly states, reflecting unipolar mean Korea? security, roadmap reasonably clear. Korea leans too antagonizing Beijing, undermines ability bring outside harder maintain autonomy vis-à-vis patron corroding democracy home acumen abroad. curries increase abandonment event Washington's winds blow away longstanding liberal internationalist consensus, fracturing. cross-pressures describe allies rivalry. real choice strengthening process Sino-US secondary-state via thing I judged current correctly; provided logical terrain sort empirical observations. argue reasoning down, embracing congruent see it. problem footing. Under Trump, declassified documents quest described “strategic primacy” explicit 186). Biden, somewhat mystified idealist still asymmetries seemingly costs 2022b). “Pacific power” inherently bad peace”; really responds prevailing conditions. priority, practical scholars “Which now, us?” tried alongside neither asks nor answers this. Therein lay Constructing set clear serves securing exacerbate fracture imperil turning objects emerge genuinely bent rule-setting, instance sense—not contain, rollback, militarily overmatch nuclear-armed shifts, pace—not nations well. Open access publishing facilitated Victoria University Wellington, Zealand Wiley – agreement Council Australian Librarians.