Repeated Implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Implementation
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. In this paper we provide an implementation “folk theorem”: for pat...
متن کاملRepeated Implementation ∗
We prove that a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if and only if it is dynamically monotonic when the number of agents is at least three. We show how to test dynamic monotonicity by building an associated repeated game. It follows that a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient among the social choice functions that are efficient. As an application, we ...
متن کاملRepeated Nash implementation
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount...
متن کاملEfficient Repeated Implementation∗
This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely-lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period. An SCF is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that (i) its Nash equilibrium set is non-empty and (ii) every Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to th...
متن کاملVirtual repeated implementation
We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2459