Repeated Quantum Games and Strategic Efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantum repeated games
In a two-stage repeated classical game of prisoners’ dilemma the knowledge that both players will defect in the second stage makes the players to defect in the first stage as well. We find a quantum version of this repeated game where the players decide to cooperate in the first stage while knowing that both will defect in the second.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3600788