Side channel Attacks on LEA and Its Countermeasures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Side Channel Attacks: Measures and Countermeasures
The main focus of modern cryptanalysis is on breaking the implementation of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to traditional attacks which primarily target on mathematically breaking the algorithms. For over the last decade these new trend of attacks, Side Channel Attacks (SCAs), are becoming increasingly popular and pose a serious threat to cryptographic devices. Researchers proposing counte...
متن کاملProvably Secure Countermeasures against Side-channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks exploit the fact that the implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information about the secret key. In power analysis attacks, the observable leakage is the power consumption of the device, which is dependent on the processed data and the performed operations. Masking is a widely used countermeasure to thwart the powerful Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. ...
متن کاملNote on side-channel attacks and their countermeasures
In the last few years ciphers making use of table-lookups in large tables—and most notably AES [12, 6]—have received a lot of bad publicity due to their vulnerability to cache attacks [15, 1, 13]. These attacks target the secret key by exploiting the variable time that an AES computation takes due to the storage of the large table in cache. From this one may conclude that algorithms that do not...
متن کاملSynthesis of Masking Countermeasures against Side Channel Attacks
We propose a new synthesis method for generating countermeasures for cryptographic software code to mitigate power analysis based side channel attacks. Side channel attacks may arise when computers and microchips leak sensitive information about the software code and data that they process, e.g., through power dissipation or electromagnetic radiation. Such information leaks have been exploited ...
متن کاملSMT-Based Verification of Software Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks
A common strategy for designing countermeasures against side channel attacks is using randomization techniques to remove the statistical dependency between sensitive data and side-channel emissions. However, this process is both labor intensive and error prone, and currently, there is a lack of automated tools to formally access how secure a countermeasure really is. We propose the first SMT so...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1598-3986
DOI: 10.13089/jkiisc.2015.25.2.449