Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity
B of long lead times associated with product development and building capacity, a supplier must initiate investment in capacity when the product development effort is ongoing. Because the product is ill defined at this point in time, the buyer is unable to commit to the future terms of trade through a courtenforceable contract. Instead, to provide incentives for capacity investment, the buyer i...
متن کاملPrice vs. Quantity in Oligopoly Games
Price-setting and quantity-setting oligopoly games lead to extremely different outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some firms use price while the remaining firms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed ol...
متن کاملPrice Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price
The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest tha...
متن کاملPrice Postponement in a Newsvendor Model with Wholesale Price-Only Contracts
We consider a variant of the wholesale price-only contract in a simple supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. In our model, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price first, and then the retailer chooses his order quantity before the stochastic demand is realized but postpones his pricing...
متن کاملThe Price of Anarchy in Supply Chains: Quantifying the Efficiency of Price-Only Contracts
I this paper, we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price-only contracts. With a price-only contract, a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price, without specifying the amount that will be transferred. It is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory/capacity decisions. We measure effic...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1523-4614,1526-5498
DOI: 10.1287/msom.1060.0126