Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning ...
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Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
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While voting systems were originally used in political science, they are now also of central importance in various areas of computer science, such as artificial intelligence (in particular within multiagent systems). Brams and Sanver [BS06] introduced sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) and fallback voting (FV), two election systems which combine the preference rankings of...
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In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategyproofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining....
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We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candidate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Logic Quarterly
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0942-5616
DOI: 10.1002/malq.200810020