Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism
Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is signi cantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary mo...
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A Refutation of Skeptical Theism David Kyle Johnson The evidential problem of evil suggests that our awareness of the existence of seemingly unjustified evils reduces the epistemic probability of God’s existence. Arguments to this effect have been most famously and successfully championed by William Rowe. 1 His defense of the argument has developed over the years, but the basics of the argument...
متن کاملTheism and Dialetheism
The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to the semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or the set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell’s paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism— the view that some contradictions are true — became a major player in the search for a solution to ...
متن کاملTheism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics
1 The Dilemma of the Theistic Platonist Theists generally hold that God is the creator of all there is distinct from himself. Traditionally, the scope of God's creative activity has extended across two disjoint realms: the physical, whose chief exemplars are ordinary middle-size objects, and the mental or spiritual, encompassing such things as angels and souls. Now, many theists are also platon...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Forum Philosophicum
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2353-7043,1426-1898
DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2013.1801.05