Socially Extended Cognition and Shared Intentionality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Shared intentionality.
We argue for the importance of processes of shared intentionality in children's early cognitive development. We look briefly at four important social-cognitive skills and how they are transformed by shared intentionality. In each case, we look first at a kind of individualistic version of the skill -- as exemplified most clearly in the behavior of chimpanzees -- and then at a version based on s...
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Introducing the notion of experience as a primitive construct, we illustrate how the BDI cycle is completed: experiences generate beliefs, which in turn generate desires, which in turn generate intentions, which in turn generate new experiences. Furthermore, the notion of experience is used to ground social BDI agents in the physical world. We do not assume an agent’s BDI model already exists, ...
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This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but comple...
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According to recent studies in developmental psychology and neuroscience, symbolic language is essentially intersubjective. Empathetically relating to others renders possible the acquisition of linguistic constructs. Intersubjectivity develops in early ontogenetic life when interactions between mother and infant mutually shape their relatedness. Empirical findings suggest that the shared attent...
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Joint activities are ubiquitous in the animal kingdom, but they differ substantially in their underlying psychological states. Humans attribute and share mental states with others in the so-called shared intentionality. Our hypothesis is that our closest nonhuman living relatives also attribute some psychological mechanisms such as perceptions and goals to others, but, unlike humans, they are n...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Frontiers in Psychology
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1664-1078
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00831