Stable constrained dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Graphics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0730-0301,1557-7368
DOI: 10.1145/2766969