Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stable Matchings for A Generalized Marriage Problem
We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962), yields outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show, that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e. there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an outcome of this procedure. In a final concluding...
متن کاملPopular Matchings in the Stable Marriage Problem
The input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B ,E) where each vertex u ∈ A ∪B ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. This is the same as an instance of the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists. A matching M∗ is said to be popular if there is no matching M such that more vertices are better off in M than in M∗. Any stable matching of G is popular, however such a matching is a mi...
متن کاملMaximum cardinality popular matchings in the stable marriage problem
Popular matching and was extensively studied in recent years as an alternative to stable matchings. Both type of matchings are defined in the framework of Stable Marriage (SM) problem: in a given bipartite graph G = (A,B;E) each vertex u has a strict order of preference on its neighborhood. A matching M is popular, if for every matching M ′ of G, the number of vertices that prefer M ′ to M is a...
متن کاملOn the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
متن کاملPart C project : Stable matchings Supervisor : James Martin Stable marriage
The “stable marriage” problem is often described as follows. There are n men and n women; each of the men has an order of preference on the women, and each of the women has an order of preference on the men. A “matching” of the people into n man-woman pairs is said to be unstable if there exist some man and some woman who both prefer each other to their partner in the matching. If there is no s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.486090