Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0305-4470,1361-6447
DOI: 10.1088/0305-4470/37/42/004