Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Single - Valued Cores
IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We Ž require them to be Pareto efficient and indi idually rational in the sense that no agent is . ever worse off than he would be on his own . In addition to these minimal requirements we also would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This property is known as strategy-proofnes...
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The following case of the Determinantal Conjecture of Marcus and de Oliveira is established. Let A and C be hermitian n × n matrices with prescribed eigenvalues a1, . . . , an and c1, . . . , cn, respectively. Let κ be a non-real unimodular complex number, B = κC, bj = κcj for j = 1, . . . , n. Then det(A− B) ∈ co 8< : n Y j=1 (aj − bσ(j)); σ ∈ Sn 9= ; , where Sn denotes the group of all permut...
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We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model-where a …nite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a …nite number of individuals-to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.008