Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution
Given a bargaining problem, the relative utilitarian (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer’s utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is ‘optimal’ in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0