Unobservable persistent productivity and long term contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Unobservable contracts as precommitments
It is well known that signing publicly observable contracts with third parties is a means of credibly committing to certain actions and hence may yield strategic advantages. Previous work on the commitment value of unobservable contracts has been limited to normal form games and extensive form games in which only one party has the option to sign a contract. In this paper, we extend the analysis...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Dynamics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1094-2025
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2009.06.003