Verifying Nuclear Disarmament—Old Challenges, New Options

Abstract In recent decades, verification methods, technologies and procedures have been significantly developed further, both technically procedurally. The competence expertise of the IAEA CTBTO considerably improved national as well international research programmes developed. A global culture with a lot knowledge, experiences has evolved in some areas. When it comes to concrete reductions credible destruction nuclear warheads, efforts today focus on delivery systems number deployed warheads. Under New START, USA Russia are verifying their bilateral obligations until 2026 based inspections. Transparency current NWSs arsenal regard exact operational status, storage production sites including fissile material is not existing yet. More R&D necessary develop new tools. Yet, community part dismantlement warheads that no longer needed or released process. “Transparency irreversibility” “safety security” non-proliferation standards key disarmament criteria which be applied future reduction cycles. dismantling warhead under control foreign inspectors yet taken place due proliferation concerns der Non-Proliferation Treaty Art. II III, prohibit disclosure sensitive information, would take if from NNWS were involved process they direct insight into design composition warhead. It therefore clear reliable must central element multilateral disarmament. NPT TPNW demands imply different scenarios, methods requirements for such options. important understand measures capabilities, so elimination proposals cannot rejected alleged ineffectiveness. Additionally, also vision ultimately eliminating weapons worldwide will achieved one big step but step-by-step approach needs specific arrangements multiple scenarios.