Vote Trading and Information Aggregation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Theory of Vote Trading and Information Aggregation†
The ability to buy “empty votes” by using derivative contracts to separate shares’ voting and cash flow rights is a cause of policy concern. We construct a formal model of a market for empty votes where informed and uninformed (and potentially biased) shareholders endogenously choose to demand or supply. There always exists an equilibrium where only informed shareholders demand votes, since uni...
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Drawing upon recent results on bandwagons in sequential voting, and by deriving analogous results for simultaneous voting, I compare the information aggregation properties of the two processes. The conclusions con...rm commonly held views about the front-loading of presidential primaries: that in tight races a simultaneous vote is preferred as it is more likely to lead to the selection of the “...
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We analyze the complexity of vote trading problems with equal-sized voting districts. For two allied vote-swapping parties, the problem is polynomially solvable. For three parties, the problem is NP-complete.
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Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study, theoretically and experimentally, the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group le...
متن کاملThe Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting1
We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,”that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01296.x