Why do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Why Do Banks Disappear: The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions
This paper examines the determinants of individual bank failures and acquisitions in the United States during 1984-1993. We use bank-specific information suggested by examiner CAMELrating categories to estimate competing-risks hazard models with time-varying covariates. We focus especially on the role of management quality, as reflected in alternative measures of xefficiency and find the ineffi...
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We examine whether banks, in providing financing for the deals, monitor firms mergers and acquisitions to the extent that will benefit acquirers shareholders. Inconsistent with the conventional theoretical argument, we do not find that bank-financed deals are associated with better stock or accounting performance than bond-financed deals or deals paid with internal cash. There is strong evidenc...
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Banks advance loans in the absence of precise knowledge in relation to the outcome of borrowers’ projects. Consequently, uncertainty in relation to loan repayment emerges. Thus, banks introduce the ‘credit standard’ as insurance against loans, so that should borrowers’ projects fail, borrowers have an alternative means of honouring their debt obligations. It is argued in this paper that in the ...
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The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- nancial crisis creditboom, the peak of the nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the nancial crisis, many governments, regulators a...
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This paper explores the motivations underlying the securitization activities of Italian banks from 1999 to 2006. The hypotheses under investigation are those of funding, specialization and regulatory capital arbitrage. To test which of the incentives suggested by these hypotheses are statistically significant securitization’s determinants, we estimate a probit model, in which the probability of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economics and Statistics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0034-6535,1530-9142
DOI: 10.1162/003465300558560