Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion.

Ralph’s theoretical approach embodies the assumptions of the classical view, and are generally consistent with a cherished (Western) theory of human nature (Barrett, 2017). These assumptions allow the classical view to ‘ring true’—to appear ob15 vious and therefore pleasing—when compared to the seemingly complex and counter-intuitive constructionist approach. As an approach to understanding emotions, Ralph employs a version of functionalism. At the turn of the 20th century, functionalism was pressed into service to rescue the classical view of emotion 20 in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence. And so it is today (for a list of disconfirming evidence, see Table 1 in Barrett, this issue). But functionalism brings with it a set of philosophical assumptions. When scientists like Ralph and I debate the nature of emotion, we are really deliberating over the validity of 25 these assumptions (see Table 1, next page). My goal here is to highlight them and offer my point of view in hopes of moving the dialogue forward. I discuss Ralph’s classical view of emotion as an attempt to defend these assumptions while at the same time remaining responsive to the accumulating empirical evi30 dence that calls them into doubt.