Tarskian and Kripkean truth

1 TRUTH & TRANSCENDENCE : Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox

I. A Methodological Turnaround. Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. As soon as the truth theorist accepts one of the most minimal principles of truth, the equivalence principle, which in one of its forms is often formulated (schematically) by (E) is true iff (if and only if) P, where “P” stands for any sentence and “” stands...

On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables som...

On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and The Next Stable Set.

A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic

A Kripkean Approach to Unknowability and Truth

We consider a language containing partial predicates for subjective knowability and truth. For this language, inductive hierarchy rules are proposed which build up the extension and anti-extension of these partial predicates in stages. The logical interaction between the extension of the truth predicate and the anti-extension of the knowability predicate is investigated.