The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibium
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D51—Exchange and Production Economies D58—Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Economies
منابع مشابه
The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibium under a replicator dynamic
We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C62—Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D51—Exchange and Production Economies D58—Computable and Other Applied Gener...
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