Optimality and the Second-price Auction with Resale
نویسنده
چکیده
Keeping and weakening only one assumption from Zheng (2002), who constructs an optimal auction with resale, we prove that the sealed-bid second-price auction with resale implements the optimal allocation in Myerson (1981)’s regular case with two bidders. We also construct other optimal mechanisms with resale.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2005