Abortion paper

Abortion rights proponents often defend their position by insisting that women have a “right over what happens to their own bodies.” Such a view generally presupposes that pre-natal offspring are but “extensions” of a woman’s body. Ironically, however, the seventeenth-century philosopher (and physician) John Locke, whose enormously influential defense of individual property (and other democratic) rights takes as its basis a fundamental right that one has over his or her own “person” (normally interpreted as “body”) explicitly declares abortion to be among the most obviously immoral actions. This article examines Locke’s view of pre-natal offspring, while demonstrating how his opposition to abortion is consistent with other aspects of his philosophy. I also examine how one author who takes Locke to defend only a limited pro-life position can develop Locke’s principles further in establishing a stronger case against abortion rights. I apply these insights to refute the arguments of three other scholars who appeal to Locke’s general political theory in defending abortion rights. Lastly, I consider the concerns of certain pro-life advocates that Locke’s principles, despite his own personal opposition to abortion, naturally tend toward alienated individualism and the commodification of human life in such a way as to lend support to an abortion rights culture. A DVOCATES FOR “ABORTION-RIGHTS” often argue for the permissibility of abortion on the grounds that a woman has a “right” to decide on what happens to her own body. The tacit assumption here, of course, is that abortion only involves the body of the woman, and not the body of another, such as that of the “fetus,” understood at least as a subject in its own right. The tendency in this case is to 1 384 Life and Learning XVI even if the fetus is an individual subject, possessing its (his or her) own body, but this is a concession that “mainstream” defenders of abortion are apt to avoid, as it is tantamount to saying that a woman’s “right to choose” trumps another’s right to life, which is an intrinsically repugnant view to most, and difficult if not impossible to defend with any adequate notion of “rights.” Locke’s texts will be internally cited by an abbreviated version of the title of the 2 work in question, followed by the book, chapter, and paragraph numbers, or in some works, by chapter and paragraph only. For example, the above text would be cited as Essay 1.3,19. regard the fetus as an “extension” of the woman’s body, at least until it reaches a stage of viability, if not all the way to the point of birth. But is such a position defensible? Significantly, the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke, whose systematic and highly influential account of natural rights is rooted in a right that one has over his or her own “person” (normally understood as “body”) apparently does not think so. While his Second Treatise of Government develops the notion that one has a right to private property as an extension of his or her body and labor, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding he lists abortion among the most obviously immoral actions (Bk. 1, ch. 3, §19). Incredibly, this 2 comment seems to have gone almost unnoticed by scholars. Locke himself never elaborates on his reasons for opposing abortion. Given his influence over the development of modern conceptions of individual liberty and natural rights (particularly in American history), a serious investigation of his opposition to abortion is certainly worthwhile. Accordingly, this paper aims to examine how the relevant concepts in the Essay, along with his more explicit political theory of the Second Treatise and other works, can be applied to form a coherent case against abortion rights. Section one will examine four authors who have relied substan-tially on Locke in formulating arguments concerning abortion. One of these, Bradford William Short, examines Locke’s medical writings and training to indicate his opposition to fetal abortion, with earlier-stage abortions remaining an open question. Three other authors who employ Locke’s political principles to defend abortion rights are then considered. Only one of these, Ingrid Makus, acknowledges Locke’s statement against abortion in the Essay, while maintaining that his opposition here contradicts his