Choice and individual welfare

Some Results for Impossibility Theorems of Social Welfare Function and Social Choice Function

We present some results on social welfare function and social choice function. First, we replace weak Pareto principle of Arrow’s axioms with strong Pareto principle, and then show that assuming unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and strong Pareto principle on a social welfare function in Arrow’s sense leads to the existence of first to nth commanders whose st...

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Choice and Individual Welfare

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking of outcomes to choice data which may not be rationalizable in any sense. An individual welfare functional maps stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model);...

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

A decomposition of strategy-proofness

Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. We find that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. Among them, individual bounded respose is not as defensible as the other two, and we present possibility results by excluding individual bounded response from strate...

Utilitarianism and discrimination

Since Becker (3), a common argument against asymmetric norms that promote minority rights over those of the majority is that such policies reduce total welfare. While this may be the case, we show that there are simple environments where aggregate sum of individual utilities is actually maximized under asymmetric norms that favor minorities. We thus maintain that without information regarding i...