Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
Using private information and club theories, this paper develops a theory of ...rms in general equilibrium. Firms are de...ned to be assignments of technologies and agents to clubs. In equilibrium, ...rms form endogenously and multiple types may coexist. We formulate the general equilibrium problem as both a Pareto program and as a competitive equilibrium. Welfare and existence theorems are provided. In the competitive equilibrium, club memberships are priced and purchased, so the market determines which organizations exist as well as who is a member. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria of several examples are computed. In our examples, elements of limited commitment and monitoring capabilities are important factors that a¤ect both the internal organization of ...rms and their equilibrium distribution. Furthermore, equilibrium organizational structure varies with the aggregate endowment of capital and the distribution of wealth. JEL Classi...cation: D51, D71, D82, L20
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تاریخ انتشار 2000