Individualism, Collectivism, and Perceptions of Control Associated with Control and Choice

To examine participants ratings of perceived control, a partial-replication was conducted with the addition of culture-based covariates (horizontal/vertical, individualism/collectivism). Participants believed they would perform an undesirable task for either a short (2 minutes) or long (20 minutes) time period. Proofreading length was determined by the contents of an envelope selected either by the researcher’s coin flip (no choice) or directly by the participant (choice). Participants were told the envelopes contained either the same time periods (no control), or different time periods (control). Results indicated an illusory control effect with the provision of choice, with no impact from the cultural covariates. Implications are discussed. INTRODUCTION It is well documented that people strive for control and mastery of their environment, and the benefits of control have received much attention (Seligman, 1975; Schulz, 1976). Much of the research in the area of control has focused on prediction, and maintained that control and prediction are nested together (Geer & Maisel, 1972; Burger & Arkin, 1980; Wortman, 1975). In other words, if one feels control over an important outcome, it also means that outcome is predictable (Schulz, 1976) – that to change the occurrence or duration of electric shocks is to also anticipate when they will occur. The resulting confound implies that one could not know whether higher perceived control was due to controllability of the outcome, predictability of the outcome, or some combination of the two. Unconfounding Prediction and Control Nickels et al. (1992) attempted to unconfound prediction and control, but had to reconceptualize the two. Under the reconceptualization, “prediction refers to knowing which outcome will likely occur before it occurs; control refers to exerting an influence over which outcome will likely occur” (p. 160). Under the reconceptualization, one could present controllable outcomes without prediction as “blind responses which make a difference in outcomes” (p.160). Across two experiments, the separation of prediction and control was successfully demonstrated. Participants in both prediction/control and no-prediction/control conditions provided higher scores on control-associated measures (control, influence, and responsibility) and lower helplessness ratings compared to participants in no-control conditions. The results supported the reconceptualization and the theoretical separation of control and prediction. Control/Choice Confound Although the aforementioned study rectified the control and prediction confound, a new confound arose. Specifically, the manipulation of control was confounded with choice as participants given controllability over the outcome also made a choice between options. This implies that one could not know whether higher perceived control was due to controllability of the outcome, choice between options, or some combination of the two (Langlois et al. 2002). Langer’s (1975) seminal work on the illusion of control demonstrated that the provision of choice alone was sufficient to produce control-related feelings. Therefore, when people are given a choice, even between options that make no difference (e.g., selecting your own lottery number before the draw), people can still report enhanced perceived control. In an effort to disentangle controllability from choice, Langlois et al. (2002) hypothesized that participants with controllability will report higher control-related feelings than participants without controllability – even without being able to predict the outcome. The presence of an illusory control effect would be evident however if participants with choice (regardless of controllability) will report higher control-related feelings than participants without choice, regardless of prediction. In a two-experiment study, participants were told they would proofread medical papers for either two minutes or 20 minutes, a time period determined based on the contents of one of two envelopes (marked ‘left’ and ‘right’). Although no proofreading was actually done, participants believed they would proofread for either a more (2-minutes) or less (20-minutes) desirable time period. The envelopes were selected either by the participant (choice) or by the experimenter’s coin-flip (no-choice). The independent variables were choice and control, so that participants were randomly assigned to one of three levels therein: choice/control, choice/no-control, and no-choice/no-control. In these conditions, choiceparticipants selected between envelopes, whereas no-choice-participants received the envelope determined by the experimenter’s coin flip. Conditions with control involved different outcomes (e.g., different time periods), whereas conditions with no control involved the same outcomes (i.e., identical time periods in the envelopes). The dependent variables for this study were participants’ self-reported feelings of prediction, control, responsibility, and helplessness. The dependent measures questionnaire was completed after the experimental manipulation. In order to hold prediction of the outcome constant at noprediction, knowledge of the outcome was withheld from participants until they had completed the questionnaire. Results indicated that to render higher feelings of perceived control, one’s choice must make a difference in the outcome (i.e., outcomes must be different). Specifically, participants in the control/choice condition felt more control and responsibility than the other two conditions, which did not differ significantly from each other. Moreover, participants with control (different outcomes) felt more influence than participants without control (same outcomes). Helplessness did not vary significantly among the groups. Overall, the illusory control hypothesis of elevated feelings of perceived control with simply the provision of a choice (where control and choice were no longer confounded) was disconfirmed. Control across Cultural Dimensions The present study is a replication of Langlois et al. (2002) with the consideration of cultural variables, namely the Western-based individualist (personal achievement) vs. Eastern-based collectivist (group accomplishment) dimension. Individualism involves a self-concept that is both autonomous and unbound by one’s in-group (e.g., close family and friends). The individualistic person’s goals do not necessarily overlap with the group’s goals and relationships are only maintained if the benefits and costs are balanced. A collectivistic orientation involves a self-concept that is bounded to the group. Goals typically overlap with the group and when a discrepancy exists, group goals are a priority. Relationships are of the utmost importance and are maintained at all costs (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990) described attributes they called pure individualistic and collectivistic types. Collectivistic people pay more attention to their in-group and behave differently in regards to that group compared to those who are individualistic. The most important in-group is the family. For those who are individualistic, the in-group and the outgroup are less defined and therefore, they do not behave as differently between these groups. As previously described, when personal goals are discrepant with group goals, collectivistic people place emphasis on group goals whereas individualistic people place emphasis on personal goals. Given the importance of the in-group for those who are collectivistic, norms are largely derived from one’s in-group. For individualistic cultures, personal likes and dislikes are more important. Triandis et al. infer that group norms largely determine social behaviour in collectivistic cultures whereas attitudes are more important in individualistic cultures. Indeed, differences in control related feelings between collectivistic and individualistic participants seem plausible. Ji, Peng, and Nisbett (2000, p. 944) state that Westerners place so much importance on control “they often fail to distinguish between objectively controllable and uncontrollable events, tend to perceive more control than they actually have, and report mistakenly high levels of predictability of events.” Furthermore, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) demonstrated that American children were more motivated to perform a task when they chose that task themselves. In contrast, Asian American children were more motivated to solve a task that their mother chose. In a study on decision-making, Kim and Drolet (2003) investigated the effects of cultural assumptions of choice and uniqueness on the tendency to seek variety in choices. The results showed cultural differences in the likelihood of variety-seeking in regards to choice rules. Those from individualistic cultures demonstrated a tendency to vary choice rules whereas those from collectivistic cultures did not. In short, people from different cultures may respond differently when given control over a choice. However, Triandis and Gefland (1998) further distinguish the individualist-collectivist dimension according to both horizontal and vertical subcategories. In general, horizontal cultures value equality among members, status is fairly even, and members are seen as similar to one another. Vertical cultures demonstrate inequality and status hierarchy; members are seen as different from one another. This creates four possible types based on the two cultural dimensions. In horizontal collectivist cultures, the self is viewed as merged with the in-group; members of the in-group are viewed as similar, and equality is emphasized. For vertical collectivist cultures, the self is viewed as an aspect of the in-group, where members are seen as different from one another; inequality is both accepted and expected. For horizontal individualist cultures, the self is viewed as autonomous but equal to other members of the group. Finally for vertical individualist cultures, members are viewed as different, status inequality is expected, and competition remains important (Singelis, et al., 1995). In the present study, whereas no specific hypotheses were made with respect to culture, it was expected that each of the four cultural covariates would influence the extent to which the three control/choice groups differed from one another. That is, after accounting for the cultural covariates of horizontal/vertical and individualist/collectivist, that the mean differences – expected to be highest among participants with both control and choice – would alter significantly.