A Game-Theoretic Framework for Jamming Attacks and Mitigation in Commercial Aircraft Wireless Networks

As wireless personal electronic devices (PEDs) become increasingly ubiquitous, the demand for wireless network services on commercial aircraft is likely to increase. Introduction of services to an aircraft network creates a host of wireless security challenges, whereby a passenger can use a wireless PED to potentially interfere with or jam valid network traffic and future inter-aircraft communications. Aircraft networks will thus require the ability to detect and appropriately respond to jamming attacks. In this work, we investigate the interactions between the aircraft network and jamming PEDs and propose the use of game theory to model jamming attacks and mitigation techniques. We present a game-theoretic framework to model these interactions and delineate tailored response mechanisms to specific threats. We then demonstrate the ability of the network to enforce desired behavior by offering incentives for passenger cooperation and punishments for failing to cooperate.