Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements in Simple Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic Commitment and Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes *
We study the impact of strategic commitment on cooperation in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes (Cournot) and complements (Bertrand) using laboratory experiments. Overall, strategic commitment has no effect on cooperation with strategic substitutes and a negative one with strategic complements. In the absence of strong strategic commitment, we find more cooperation in the com...
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We examine the e¤ect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate external-ities. We nd that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games withstrategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These e¤ects are reversed ingames with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these resultsto Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, ...
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