Financial Intermediation and Entry Deterrence
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we analyze the interaction between an incumbent rm's nancial contract with a bank and its product market decisions in the face of the threat of entry, in a dynamic model. The main results of the paper are: there exists a separating equilibrium with no limit pricing; the low-cost incumbent repays more to the bank in the rst period, due to the threat of entry; and there are parameter values for which the bank makes more pro ts with the threat of entry than without. JEL Categories: D8, G3, L1.
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تاریخ انتشار 2000